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When will it make sense to consider robots candidates for moral standing? Major
disagreements exist between those who find that question important and those who
do not, and also between those united in their willingness to pursue the question. I narrow
in on the approach to robot rights called relationalism, and ask: if we provide robots moral
standing based on how humans relate to them, are we moving past human chauvinism, or
are we merely putting a new dress on it? The background for the article is the clash
between those who argue that robot rights are possible and those who see a fight for robot
rights as ludicrous, unthinkable, or just outright harmful and disruptive for humans. The
latter group are by some branded human chauvinists and anthropocentric, and they are
criticized and portrayed as backward, unjust, and ignorant of history. Relationalism, in
contrast, purportedly opens the door for considering robot rights and moving past
anthropocentrism. However, I argue that relationalism is, quite to the contrary, a form
of neo-anthropocentrism that recenters human beings and their unique ontological
properties, perceptions, and values. I do so by raising three objections: 1) relationalism
centers human values and perspectives, 2) it is indirectly a type of properties-based
approach, and 3) edge cases reveal potentially absurd implications in practice.
Keywords: anthropocentrism, ethics, moral standing, robots, rights, social robots, robot rights, neo-
anthropocentrism
INTRODUCTION
If we provide robots moral standing because of how humans relate to them, are we moving past
human chauvinism, or are we merely putting a new dress on it? Questions related to moral standing
go back a long way (Sætra, 2019), and they always trigger strong emotions and require that we deal
with both difficult and fundamental questions. Different types of humans–demarcated by color, sex,
and a range of other arbitrary attributes of questionable moral relevance–have fought tough battles
for being recognized as of equal, or at least some, value. Other entities, such as animals, cannot fight
for their own rights, but humans have still taken it upon themselves to fight for their rights (Regan,
2004). Even rivers, trees, and the abiotic parts of the environment have been the subject of a fight for
rights because humans have decided to become their champions (Stone, 1972).
The latest installment in the saga of rights–the fight for other’s rights–are robots. While robots are
somewhat new, the debates they give rise to are arguably not, as they draw upon and continue debates
from environmental ethics. While not new, the question of how artificial entities fit into these old
debates is attracting increased attention (Harris and Anthis, 2021). Old arguments, on old
battlegrounds, are rehashed, as robot champions (champions for the rights of robots) clash with
those who call the fight for robots right ludicrous, unthinkable, or just outright harmful and
disruptive of the fight for equal get for all humans (Birhane and Van Dijk, 2020a; 2020b). The latter
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anthropocentric, and they are consequently criticized and labeled
as both backward, unjust, and ignorant of history.
One particular form of argument for imagining robot rights is
relationalism, with Coeckelbergh. (2010), Coeckelbergh. (2011),
Jones. (2013), Gunkel. (2018b), and Gellers. (2020) as some of its
champions in arms. Thinking otherwise, Gunkel calls it, when he
argues that relational ethics opens the door for seriously
considering robot rights and taking a step or two past
anthropocentrism. In this article, I challenge the implicit and
at times explicit claim that relationalism allows us to move
past anthropocentrism, as I argue that the approach is in fact
a form of neo-anthropocentrism that recenters human beings and
their unique ontological properties, perceptions, and values and
that this is quite the opposite of the stated purpose of this
purported thinking outside the box (Gunkel, 2018b). I do so
by raising three objections: 1) relationalism centers human values
and perspectives, 2) it is indirectly a type of properties-based
approach, and 3) edge cases reveal potentially absurd implications
in practice.
My goal is thus to challenge the proponents of this approach to
clarify and further develop their theories, and others have
similarly claimed that relationism “leaves us with many
unresolved questions” (Tavani, 2018). I will, however, not
pursue the question of whether or not the relational approach
is more useful or better than the alternatives, as the purpose is to
highlight issues related to the anthropocentric nature of the
approach. This also means that I will not be evaluating the
different varieties and the nuances of the various philosophical
foundations used by the different researchers in this tradition,
beyond what is required for establishing whether or not the
emerging tradition–as a tradition–is anthropocentric.
In order to evaluate the nature of relationalism, in
Anthropocentrism and the Others I examine the nature of
anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. More
importantly, I highlight the importance of examining the
different types of each, because the umbrella terms
“anthropocentrism” and “non-anthropocentrism” themselves
contain too much variation to be philosophically meaningful.
In The relational Turn as Neo-Anthropocentrism I move on to
relationalism, to briefly present how its proponents present the
approach before I proceed to examine it in light of the types
discussed in Anthropocentrism and the Others. I end this section
by presenting the three objections which together constitute my
challenges to relationalism.
ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND THE OTHERS
As the starting point for the examination of the nature of the
relational turn in the robot rights discourse, the field of
environmental ethics provides a range of applicable tools and
concepts. It could even be argued that the question of the moral
standing of robots is a part of environmental ethics, and does not
necessitate new forms of ethics such as robot ethics.
Environmental ethics is, after all, at times understood as the
examination of how moral thinking and action can be expanded
both beyond humans and beyond the present (Nolt, 2014). Just as
the robot rights movement is often perceived as a form of
unwarranted and misdirected activism (Birhane and Van Dijk,
2020a; Birhane and Van Dijk, 2020b), the same often goes for
environmental ethicists, at times labeled “treehuggers,” anti-
humanists or misanthropes who fight for the rights of animals
and the natural world at the expense of human beings (Drengson,
1995; Kopnina et al., 2018; Rottman et al., 2021). Such a
denouncement is, however, based on the erroneous notion
that there is a “hierarchy of ethics” and that all research
should be directed to whichever problems the critics consider
to be more important than considering robot–or
environmental–rights (Sætra and Fosch-Villaronga, 2021).
Key concepts related to the moral standing of robots are moral
community, moral agency, and moral patiency (Nolt, 2014). All
entities that are deemed worthy of moral consideration belong to
the moral community, and anyone who has a claim on moral
consideration is a moral patient. Some entities will have such a
claim and an associated moral duty, and these are considered
moral agents. The moral community is here considered a purely
hypothetical construct, and any type of moral community is
theoretically possible. One theory might argue that only humans
have a claim for moral consideration, while another might argue
that humans are not even parts of the moral community.
Robots can, in theory, certainly be considered parts of our
moral community, but few as of yet have argued that they are full-
fledgedmoral agents. Most existing theories will consider humans
moral agents while including some other entities as moral
patients with various claims to moral consideration. It is
important to stress that no universally accepted definitions of
which traits warrant moral patiency exist (Gellers, 2020; Gunkel,
2018b), and this is one of the very reasons for the emergence of
the relational approach, as we will later see. Neither are the
criteria for moral agency sufficiently clear to serve as the basis of
agreement between moral philosophers of various stripes.
However, I’ll argue that it is reasonable to posit that if we
are to provide an entity with a duty to consider the moral claims
of others, they must have a least the semblance of the sensory
and cognitive capacities to do so–they must have moral
competence (Nolt, 2014). As argued by Næss. (1989) humans
are the first species with the capacity to understand how their
behavior affects other beings and consequently change this
behavior to achieve some form of equilibrium. Humans can,
he argues, “perceive and care for the diversity of their
surroundings” (Næss, 1989, p. 23), even if they arguably do
not always do so.
This framework allows us to examine how different people
ascribe moral standing to different forms of entities, potentially
including robots. Rather than focusing on the resulting ascription
of moral standing to various entities, I’m concerned with how the
theorists most clearly associated with the “relational turn” in
robot ethics arrive at the possibility of rights for robots, and in
particular whether or their approach is less anthropocentric than
other approaches. In order to achieve this, a somewhat
roundabout trip into the murky definitional waters
surrounding anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is
required. That is because, as we shall see, these terms are
often used in a confusing and non-specific manner.
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Anthropocentrism
Ethical theories that assume the centrality of humans in any
consideration of moral standing or value are often referred to as
anthropocentric (Nolt, 2014). Posthumanism–focusing on the
“decentering of humans”–and the biospherical egalitarianism of
Næss, for example, might both be argued to entail clear rejections
of anthropocentrism (Næss, 1973; Meyer, 2001; Braidotti, 2013).
Robot rights is another phenomenon that might at first seem to
be–and is often argued to be–non-anthropocentric. Concluding
that they are non-anthropocentric is, however, premature, as I
will argue that even theories that do not consider humans to be
most–or the only things–valuable can clearly be anthropocentric,
depending on their method of ascribing moral standing to others.
To make this point, the most important types of
anthropocentrism must be examined.1 I rely on Nolt (2014)
terminology for distinguishing between axiological and ethical
anthropocentrism in what follows.
Axiological Anthropocentrism
While there may be many reasons for humans putting themselves
at the center of any moral examination, Nolt. (2014) points to the
emergence of monotheism as the key factor which led to a focus
on humanity as a meaningful group, rather than mere humans as
contained in distinct cultures and smaller groups. He then
connects anthropocentrism and monotheism to the notion of
human rights, which is arguably one of the most important
manifestations of anthropocentric ethics prevalent in modern
societies (Zimmerman, 1985). Much like Aristotle had done
before them, late antiquity Western philosophers, working in
the age of emerging monotheism, saw the world as “an exquisitely
designed hierarchical structure in which all things had God-given
values and purposes” (Nolt, 2014, p. 64). All things, according to
this line of thinking, exist to serve the needs of “higher” entities.
Water serves the needs of plants, which serve the need of animals,
which serve the need of humans, for example. A central example
of this line of thinking is the idea of a great chain of being
(Lovejoy, 1936). In the original chain angels and God superseded
humans, while the modern secular and anthropocentric version
could be argued to place humans at the pinnacle.
This kind of anthropocentrism, with humans at the center and
everything else assigned value by how it serves human needs, is
referred to as axiological anthropocentrism (Nolt, 2014). If
humans, for example, tend to see something of
themselves–something that they value–in robots, this could
become the basis of offering such entities some form of moral
consideration, or protection (Darling, 2016a). This also relates to
the notion that how we treat other entities impacts us. If, for
example, humans somehow hurt themselves by mistreating
animals, or robots (Darling, 2016a), this could give rise to
both moral and legal protection of such entities. Not for the
entitie’s sake, but for ours. The moral standing and value of
entities are, according to this theory, assigned by and for human
purposes. For us, by us. While somewhat similar to the religious
view that things have value according to God’s desires and
purposes, it is clearly distinct, as no God or gods serve any
necessary purpose in axiological anthropocentrism. If humans
find a purpose for God, however, God will be valued accordingly,
but not the other way around.
Ethical Anthropocentrism
A different form of anthropocentrism, one that is often conflated
with the axiological variety, is ethical anthropocentrism. This is a
theory that encompasses the view that humans are morally
considerable, and most other things are not (Nolt, 2014). The
strict variety states that only humans are morally considerable,
while other varieties assign some–but not much–value to some
non-human entities. It is easy to see why axiological and ethical
anthropocentrism are often conflated, but it is still important to
distinguish between them. Axiological anthropocentrism allows
for a far more inclusive moral community than ethical
anthropocentrism, provided that humans find value in other
beings, or that humans simply find value in providing other
beings with moral standing. The common denominator is that
humans are centered, as they are either of superior moral
standing or the only cause of moral standing provided to
others. The instrumental approach to robot rights is often
based on ethical anthropocentrism, and, for example, the
notion that robots should be slaves (Bryson, 2010), is based on
the idea that they do not have moral worth, even if they can
indeed be useful. According to such positions, they could be said
to have instrumental value to humans, but no intrinsic value.
Ethical anthropocentrism is also clearly linked to the idea of
human chauvinism, which is, according to some, deeply
embedded in western culture and consciousness (Seed, 1988).
Non-Anthropocentrism
While we are currently seeing a growing concern for the
environment–in the shape of animals, the climate, or various
ecosystems–it is still considered relatively radical to argue in favor
of non-anthropocentric ethical theories. After all, a whole lot of
those concerned with the climate and biological diversity, for
example, make few efforts to hide the fact that their concerns stem
from the negative effects for human beings if the environment is
impoverished or changed in ways unfavorable to human
flourishing. Truly non-anthropocentric theories must argue in
favor of the worth of nature regardless of how nature impacts
humans, and as with anthropocentrism, there are several types of
non-anthropocentrism.
Rights and Ontology-Based Ethical
Non-Anthropocentrism
One apparent way to move past anthropocentrism is to provide
other entities with rights. I will only consider the approach that
assumes that the entities that receive rights are capable of being
bearers of rights, and not an entirely legalistic approach that
ascribes “rights” to nature, corporations, etc., for merely
instrumental purposes. Robots can, Sætra (2021a) argues,
certainly be considered as some sort of limited liability
1One distinction I will not pursue in this article is that between short- and
long-term anthropocentrism, which distinguishes between those that believe
only humans that live right now have moral standing and those that consider
potential future humans as well
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corporations if this serves socio-political needs, but this must not
be conflated with the notion that legal status also provides moral
status.
Peter Singer and Tom Reagan and Singer. (1976) are two well-
known proponents of animal rights, but others have also asked
whether, for example, trees, rivers, or entire ecosystems have
rights (Stone, 1972). The question given rise to by all these
approaches is, however: what are rights derived from?
Answers range from philosophy, deities, natural law, the use
of (human) reason, etc. One particular approach, which is the loci
of this article, is one where rights are ascribed on the basis of the
nature of relationships, and the examination of this approach will
be saved for the next chapter.
One kind of non-anthropocentrism uses traits, or ontological
features of entities, to argue that humans are not really special,
and thus do not deserve a special moral status. These theories are
often related to the problems of demarcation that arise as soon as
someone attempts to defend ethical anthropocentrism by
describing why humans are different from animals (Nolt,
2014). In a discussion of what distinguishes humans from
machines, for example, Sætra (2019) examines a range of
different properties, or traits, that have historically been used
to distinguish humans from other entities. Reason, a soul, life,
etc.–all these concepts fail, he argues, as the basis for clearly
demarcating humans from others. When traits are tested as
criteria for human value, marginal cases are often used to
demonstrate the problems associated with the various criteria
(Dombrowski, 1997; Nolt, 2014). For example, if reason is our
criteria, how do we deal with the fact that some animals have
more of it than some humans (Sætra, 2019)? Such a traits-based
approach could arguably be both anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric, and also anthropocentric in two different
ways. If traits are chosen in order to limit moral
consideration to Homo sapiens, we get ethical
anthropocentrism, while other approaches focus on traits
shared by other entities as well–such as sentience–in which
we might have axiological anthropocentrism.
Another way to potentially derive rights, obligations, and
moral standing from a situation in which none exist is the
contractualist approach (Hobbes, 1946). With this approach,
rights are derived from consent based on contract, but neither
the contract nor the consent need be explicit. In Hobbe’s social
contract theory, for example, the contract can be considered a
hypothetical thought experiment aimed at generating agreement
of what reasonable people would agree to, and thus the contract is
not taken to be an actual contract that each and every individual
has actually agreed to (Sætra, 2014). While Sætra. (2014) argues
that contractualism might lead to a type of environmentalism
based on human self-interest, the social contract theorist
Carruthers. (1992) has warned that if we extend our moral
communities to encompass other entities, morality might be
diluted. Despite such warnings, contractualism can potentially
lead to rights for others, just as we have extended rights to animals
and a range of other beings that cannot themselves be an active
contracting party. One approach to a contractual approach to
non-human rights is to have humans serve as curators or
guardians (Sætra, 2014).
The notion of rights is a topic worthy of its own article, and as I
am mainly concerned with understanding how the relational
approach to moral standing relates to anthropomorphism, I save
the rest of this discussion for The relational Turn as Neo-
Anthropocentrism, in which the relational turn is examined in
more detail. Before that, two non-anthropocentric varieties will
provide more insight into just how we might justify the
decentering of humans.
Axiological Non-Anthropocentrism
Axiological anthropocentrism ascribes value to entities
according to how valuable they are perceived to be by
humans. Humans are a relatively diverse bunch, however,
and it is here important to be wary of the danger of
conflating western values with human values (Gellers, 2020).
Moving beyond the discussion of whose human values matter,
the axiologically non-anthropocentric approach starts with the
assumption that human values are not the only values (Nolt,
2014). Other entities might indeed have values as well, or things
might at the very least potentially be good or bad for them. The
problem with this theory, as compared to the anthropocentric
variety, is that it is difficult to determine what the values of non-
human entities really are. Three main approaches to discovering
these are the hedonistic, preference-satisfaction, and objective
welfare, all with their distinct strengths and obvious weaknesses
(Nolt, 2014).
The hedonistic approach entails an emphasis on aggregate
pleasure and pain, and it is often associated with the
consequentialist variety of ethics referred to as utilitarianism.
However, concerning moral standing, the ability to experience
pleasure and pain is what matters, and sentientism is perhaps the
most prominent variety in this category. The key objection to
sentientism in the context of robot rights is that it once again
entails examining the ontological status of subjects–here the
capability of sentience. Furthermore, since it is most often
biocentric (Nolt, 2014), it tends to exclude machines.
However, critics argue that it is difficult to distinguish human
pain and pleasure from what is “experienced” by a sophisticated
machine, just as reason and other objective qualifiers also bring us
into murky waters. This objection to biocentrism becomes
increasingly relevant with modern advances in biomimetic
robots (Winfield, 2012), and various robots built to model
human emotions, homeostasis etc. (Cominelli et al., 2018;
Man and Damasio, 2019).
Preference-satisfaction is a broader form of consequentialism
in which entities may be thought to have interests beyond
pleasure and pain, and what subjects themselves consider good
and desire is what matters. But how do we uncover the
preferences of entities that cannot speak or express
themselves? Those who are capable of acting are helpful in
that we might propose using the theory of revealed
preferences from economic theory (Samuelson, 1948), but
what about abiotic nature? And what about robots, who can
both speak and act? This is where the question of agency comes
up, and in this article, I adhere to the position that robots cannot
as of now be said to be capable of owning and being responsible
for their own actions, and consequently, I assume that their words
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and actions do not represent the robot’s own preferences in a
meaningful way (Sætra, 2021a).
The final approach consists of basing one’s evaluation on some
notion of objective welfare–an approach that might result from
wanting to deduce what is good for, and thus assumed preferred,
by entities. Næss (1989), for example, uses the notion of
flourishing as a fundamental good for all entities. Highly
useful for dealing with entities that neither speak nor act, but
also for humans whomight not realize their own best interests. Or
at least so the paternalists might say.
Ethical Biocentrism
A different approach is one in which entities are quite simply
regarded as origins of value. Inherent, or intrinsic, value is the
term often used for this approach (Næss, 1989; Nolt, 2014), as
their value is assumed to be entirely disconnected from their
instrumental value to humans or to how humans imagine value.
One example of such a theory is Arne Næss’s deep ecology, based
on the notion of biocentric egalitarianism and an outright
rejection of anthropocentrism and the superior moral value of
humans (Næss, 1989).
As compared to the previous type of non-anthropocentrism,
ethical biocentrism does not require us to uncover, or conjure up,
the interests, preferences, etc., of other entities. Instead, they are
considered valuable just because of being what they are, which is
why the terms intrinsic or inherent value are often used. Midges
and ticks, for example, have very little going for them in terms of
obvious instrumental value for humans–particularly if people’s
opinions about them, rather than the ecosystem services they
provide–are the basis of ascribing value. However, in theories
such as Næss’s deep ecology, even such beings are considered
valuable by virtue of simply being what they are, and they are
provided with the same rights to flourish like the rest of us. The
details of what constitutes inherent or intrinsic value, and the
differences used in describing who and what has such value, is
beyond the scope of this article, and it suffices for now state that
such approaches are effective in ascribing rights to animals, and at
other parts of nature, while it has not been particularly useful for
imagining robot rights.
THE RELATIONAL TURN AS
NEO-ANTHROPOCENTRISM
The time has come to consider how to categorize theories
belonging to what is often referred to as the “relational turn”2
in robot ethics (Gerdes, 2016). The goal of what follows is not to
examine whether or not “relationalism” (Coeckelbergh, 2010),
“social-relational ethics” (Coeckelbergh, 2010; Gunkel, 2018b;
Harris and Anthis, 2021), or “ecological relationalism” (Jones,
2013) is right, wrong, beneficial, etc. Neither is it a deep
philosophical examination of the nuances and differences
between the various manifestations of relationalism beyond
what is required to establish the fundamental approach shared
by these theorists.
Rather, the goal is to examine whether relationalism is
anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric, and using the terms
established also determines more specifically which type most
accurately describes it. The reason why uncovering this is of
interest is that it is relevant to the discussions that emerge as soon
as differences of opinion with regard to the possibility or
desirability of robot rights surface. In such discussions,
opponents of robot rights might argue that pursuing such
questions is pointless, or even outright harmful, as more
important questions related to human flourishing should be
prioritized (Birhane and van Dijk, 2020b). Some arguing in
favor of robot rights might then accuse the opponent of being
human chauvinists, and either explicitly or implicitly indicate that
the opponents are anthropocentric human chauvinists, while
those open to robot rights are not. Whether or not these
proponents are right is what I address in the following.
The Relational Turn
What is here described as the relational turn refers to the idea that
moral consideration should be premised on social relations rather
than ontological or socio-political frameworks (Coeckelbergh,
2010). What I refer to as relationism is not the particular
philosophy of one person, however, and I will, in general,
refer to relationism as a tradition manifested through the work
of Mark Coeckelbergh. (2010) Raya Jones. (2013), David Gunkel.
(2018b), and Josh Gellers. (2020).
Relationalism is, however, not a new phenomenon, and it is
often traced back to the relational approach of Arne Næss
(Brennan and Lo, 2021; Næss, 1989). It is also closely related
to care ethics (Donovan and Adams, 1996, Donovan and
Adams, 2007), which emphasizes relationships, and both
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric varieties of care
ethics have been proposed. Common for the traditional care
ethics is that they are routinely criticized for their inability to
extend rights to strangers–both humans and other types of
others (Nolt, 2014).
One response to this is the relational ethic of Palmer. (2010), which
is based on ecofeminism and its emphasis on relationships rather than
individuals in isolation (Palmer, 2003). She, like the relationists in the
robot ethics camp, suggests that responsibilities and moral standing
are not just matters of capabilities, but also of our interactions with
others. However, relationships are used differently by Palmer than by
the robot ethicists, as she argues that actual interactions create
responsibilities, more so than relatively abstract notions about how
humans, in general, might be capable of forming relations with other
entities. Consequently, I focus on relationalism as it is detailed in the
robot ethics discourse, as robot relationalism and the traditional
varieties just discussed are somewhat different.
The problem with traditional theories, Coeckelbergh. (2010)
argues, is that they all–deontological, utilitarian, and partly virtue
ethics–rely on what he calls “ontological features” of the entities
in question. These are, for example, requirements related to
2In the following, I will mainly refer to these theories as relationalism, unless
specifically pointing to the various names the different authors themselves use. It is
also worth noting that it seems unfortunate to speak of these theories as “relational
ethic," as that is an already-existing field of study focusing on ethical conduct in
various relationships, such as nurse-patient relationships (Ellis, 2007).
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biological life, rationality, sentience, etc., as we have already seen.
He proceeds to argue that we need a “social ecology,” which
is–much like Arne Næss deep ecology–based on the science of
ecology combined with “Eastern worldviews.” This is also
discussed at some length by Næss himself, and Jones. (2013),
Jones. (2015), Gunkel. (2018b), Gellers. (2020), all emphasize the
need for and potential utility of moving beyond traditional
Western world-views in order to arrive at an improved
understanding of how to understand moral standing and the
nature of various others.
What becomes important, then, is the network of interactions
and relations between entities, and not the entities in isolation
and their properties.
The alternative approach I propose attempts to avoid
the skepticism by replacing the requirement that we
have certain knowledge about real ontological features
of the entity by the requirement that we experience the
features of the entity as they appear to us in the context
of the concrete human-robot relations and the wider
social structures in which that relation is embedded
(Coeckelbergh, 2010, p. 14).
Rather than ascribing moral standing on the basis of
characteristics of the entity–the properties-based approach–the
very fact that we relate with other entities becomes the basis for
obligations and claim for moral consideration (Gellers, 2020). As
with the traditional types of relational theories, what matters is not
necessarily whether or not the others are like us (Darling, 2016a),
or if we see ourselves reflected in them (Sætra, 2021b), but rather
how these others become actors in our social structures with which
we interact. What I refer to as relationalism is, as mentioned, often
referred to as social-relational ethics for this reason. This is also
related toArneNæss’s notion that self-realization entails coming to
see ourselves as nodes in a relational total-field image (Næss, 1989).
This leads to identifying with the other nodes in the field, and this is
in theory accompanied by an acknowledgment of how all is, in
reality, one, and all of value. While deep ecology opens for
including both biotic and abiotic nature in this field, artificial
life has no obvious function in this network. In robot relationalism,
the fact that we relate to robots is taken as an indication that these
entities are, in fact, nodes of value due to these relations.
The key argument, as presented by Gunkel. (2018b), is that our
evaluation of what another entity is, in a moral context, depends on
how it is treated and not some isolated consideration of what the
thing in isolation is. In particular, it is important that the other is not
simply reduced to a reflection of ourselves and some sort of alter-ego
which is perceived as valuable because of its likeness to us (Gunkel,
2018a). Gunkel draws heavily on Levinasian philosophy in his
explorations of the potential for robot rights, and it is interesting
to note how he argues that it is important to “break free from the
gravitational pull of Levinas’s own anthropocentric interpretations”
(Gunkel, 2018a, p. 97). In his reinterpretation of Levina’s philosophy
in a way that opens for considering robots to be meaningful
others–as Levinas himself does not do–the question is whether
Gunkel simply develops a new kind of anthropocentric theory or
if he arrives at a non-anthropocentric theory. The objections which
are shortly presented suggest that what has occurred is a move from
ethical to axiological anthropocentrism and not a move to non-
anthropocentrism.
Gellers. (2020) explores both the legal and moral status of robots,
and while the former is outside the scope of this article, his
considerations regarding the latter are largely in line with the
preceding authors. He explicitly argues that the relational ethic
proposed by Levinasian scholars (and he here includes
Coeckelbergh and Gunkel) is both promising and that it has
moved old debates, but also that it might go too far in abandoning
the role of properties. This–the role of properties in our encounters
with others–is also the very basis of one of my challenges.
What is of most interest here is not the nuances of the different
varieties of relationalism, but whether or not relationalism really
succeeds in moving us past anthropocentrism, or if it is instead a
new type of anthropocentrism.
Neo-Anthropocentric Relationalism
On the basis of the preceding considerations, I now turn to an
explanation of why I argue that relationalism is a neo-
anthropocentric ethical theory. Rather than providing the
means to move beyond anthropocentrism and the traits-based
approach, I argue, based on the objections presented below, that
the theory is both anthropocentric and dependent on traits-based
considerations. In addition, the theory is faced with a practical
challenge related to its potential use in practice. In the following I
outline three main challenges for relationalism: 1) relationalism
centers human values and perspectives, 2) it is indirectly a type of
properties-based approach, and 3) edge cases reveal potentially
absurd implications in practice.
Human-Centered Relations
My first objection is that relationalism is arguably deeply
anthropocentric because moral standing is derived exclusively
from how human beings perceive and form relations with other
entities. As we have seen, moral standing is here derived from
how something is treated, and not what it is. This means that
humans are key to determining value, as it is how entities are
treated and perceived by humans that determine their moral
standing (Gunkel, 2018b). While this surely opens the door for
moral standing for robots that are able to mobilize human social
instincts and trigger social responses (Sætra, 2020), it is hard to
see how this constitutes a form of non-anthropocentrism. On the
contrary, it seems like a clear representation of a system based on
the axiological anthropocentrism defined in Axiological
Anthropocentrism. It is interesting to note that I here levy the
same kind of criticism against relationalism that Gunkel (2018a,
p. 95) uses as an objection against Darling. (2016a): “because what
ultimately matters is how “we” see things, this proposal remains
thoroughly anthropocentric and instrumentalizes others.” While
Gunkel imagines the other as something more than a mirror-
image, using Levina’s theory to modify our understanding of the
other arguably does not introduce reciprocity or a true
recognition of the other for their own sake, since it is human
perceptions and experience of the other that is used as the basis
for determining value. Thus, relationalism is subject to the very
same critique aimed by its proponent on another theory.
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Two different anthropocentric doctrines could be developed
from relationalism. One is similar to the relationism of Palmer.
(2010), in which relations with actual entities are constitutive of
moral responsibilities. In the case of robots, I might interact
with a Paro robotic seal (Paro Robots, 2021), for example, and
feel that I have developed a certain rapport with this entity. This
would in turn create responsibilities towards that particular
robot, but not toward other Paros. The other approach would be
to argue on a more detached level that actual relations are not
relevant, while the potential to form relations is Such a doctrine
would entail that if humans are capable of forming relationships
with Paro robots, then all Paro robots must be awarded moral
consideration. This, however, would take us right back to the
properties-based approach that the relationists purportedly
want to move past.
Of central importance, however, is the fact that the relations being
described by the robot ethicists are arguably not really based on true
relations at all, as the emphasis is not on mutuality but on how
humans perceive and treat other entities. What occurs in the other
entity is seemingly irrelevant, and further highlights the relatively
extreme anthropocentric nature of the theory. It must be noted that
this stands in contrast to care ethics and relational ethics as
established in the domain of animal ethics, in which mutuality is
a fundamental part of any relationship worth considering. In robot
relationism, mutuality and considerations regarding the capabilities,
intentions, experiences, etc., of the other is excluded from the
analysis, and this leaves us with a peculiar one-sided approach to
relations that gives rise to my challenges.
Also of importance is the fact that anthropocentrism is not
necessarily a bad thing, once properly understood. Non-
anthropocentrism is a term mired in difficulty, as some argue
that it is impossible for humans to avoid being anthropocentric,
as the very notion of value–either instrumental or intrinsic–is
necessarily based on a human perspective (Hayward, 1997;
Hargrove, 2003). If robot rights theorists accept this view,
however, they might be better off by using Hargrove’s term
weak anthropocentrism (2003) to describe their own theory,
and argue why this is preferable to strong anthropocentrism.
This would dramatically clarify these debates and would be an
improvement over a situation in which anthropocentrism alone is
assumed to provide sufficient clarity. It does not, and
consequently needs to be further elaborated.
Properties Strike Back
My second objection is that relationalism is in reality a camouflaged
variety of the properties-based approach. This is so because how we
relate to other entities is determined by the properties of these others.
At the very least, as Gellers. (2020) acknowledges, it significantly
influences relations. However, we cannot arguably perceive
someone’s true nature, intentions, feelings, etc., so how are the
perceived relations with others arrived at?
As discussed in the previous challenge, proponents of relationism
generally tend to argue that we need not consider the “internal”
properties of robots. If a robot acts inways that allow it to engage in the
kinds of social interactions with humans that the relationists deem
important, this is sufficient (Tavani, 2018). This, again, relates to what
Danaher (2020) calls ethical behaviorism, which entails that moral
duties and responsibilities are grounded in external and observable
action, and not entitie’s internal processes and mechanisms.
However, how we relate to someone, and how an entity acts, is
dependent on their properties. I might, for example, say that I do
not care what species something is, but will evaluate moral
standing merely by how I relate to it. The problem, then, is
that this will often entail providing moral standing to exactly the
same entities as before because those with the properties of
humans are the ones I relate to in the manner I consider to be
constitutive of moral standing.
It is easy to see why relationalism has emerged so clearly in the
discourse on robot rights, as robots are now designed with a range
of exactly those properties that are conducive to social relations
(Sætra, 2020). It is also an approach that takes us past what might
be labeled biological chauvinism, as traditional theories, both
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric, have often focused
on the biological foundation of life and moral standing (Gellers,
2020; Manzotti and Jeschke, 2016). Emphasizing biology is indeed
problematic, as it excludes mechanical robots from consideration,
while it also introduces problems related to the status of humans
who integrate with non-biological technology (Sætra, 2019).
Once again, this creates the foundation for two different strands
of relationalism. One in which actual properties and capacities
required for mutual and reciprocated relationships are used as the
basis of determining the potential for relationships, and one in
which perceived properties are taken into consideration. The latter
strand gives rise to the third objection described below, while the
former arguably excludes even the most sophisticated biomimetic
robots as parties to relationships.
Relationalism is at times also argued to be able to account for
changing social relations and social constructs (Gunkel, 2018b),
and this is perceived as an advantage of the approach. In response,
proponents of properties-based theories could point out that this
is also the case for traditional properties-based approaches, as
phenomena like rationality, sentience, consciousness, etc., are
also social constructs that change over time, with clear
consequences for who and what are accorded moral worth.
Edges Cases and the Problem of Anthropomorphism
My third challenge is that any approach tomoral standing based on
one-sided “relations” based exclusively on perceived properties,
coupled with the human tendency to anthropomorphize other
entities, leads to potentially absurd implications when the theory is
applied in practice. Anthropomorphism describes the process of
attributing human properties to other things, i.e. robots, and this
can occur intentionally or unintentionally (Coeckelbergh, 2021).
The situation that ensues is one in which humans might
anthropomorphize other entities, and consequently feel that
they relate to these things, which in turn triggers the relationist
inclination to use this to accord the thing moral standing.
People anthropomorphize social robots and tend to attribute
various traits such as purpose, intentions, etc. to them, despite these
robots not actually having such traits of capabilities (Sætra, 2021a). But
people also anthropomorphize a wide range of less sophisticated
things. A volleyball, for example, in the movie Cast Away, but also
a wide range of other things, such as computers, dolls, etc. (Reeves and
Nass, 1996; Levy, 2009; Darling, 2016b). In such situations, who is to
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decide whether these relations, which people according to their own
subjective experience are forming with these things, are constitutive of
moral standing for the non-human part of the relationship or not?
Are we to rely on objective evaluations of which relationships
shouldmatter? If so, the process and criteria bywhich to perform such
evaluations–andwhowill perform them–become important questions
that provide the ground for much potential conflict. On the other
hand, if subjective evaluations are to be given consideration, we might
in fact end up with a form of subjective relationism where robots are
providedmoral standing. But so is potentially a volleyball, and a child’s
security blanket. As a basis for arriving at a universal theory for
determining moral standing, an approach with arguably absurd
implications seem to require some more development before it is
workable. At the very least, it highlights how an ethical theory ofmoral
standing such as relationalism does not give rise to objective and
universal outcomes, but rather show the political nature of deciding
who in the end decides.
CONCLUSION
The question I have sought to answer is whether relationalism can
help move us past chauvinistic and anthropocentric moral
theories. I have accepted that relationalism can indeed be
effective in allowing non-humans to be awarded moral
standing, but I have also argued that the method by which it
does so is beleaguered by certain fundamental problems. Firstly,
that it is anthropocentric, much like the theories it seeks to
replace. Secondly, that it is based on traits, either objectively
or subjectively assessed. Thirdly, that anthropomorphism
potentially leads to absurdities whenever relationism is used as
the basis of determining moral standing without combining
relationism with a properties-based approach.
Relationalism is, I argue, based on Axiological
Anthropocentrism. However, as the theory is not premised on
the explicit centering of human perception of value as the basis of
moral standing, and since it is also proclaimed to be a solution to
the problems of both traditional anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric theories, the theory will be labeled neo-
anthropocentric–a type of new anthropocentrism. The novelty
of the theory is that it dismisses all explicit references to the
superior moral status of humans or human instrumental value
as the basis of moral valuation, which means that it is not based on
ethical anthropocentrism and human chauvinism. However, it also
rejects non-anthropocentric theorie’s adherence to concepts such
as inherent value or biocentric egalitarianism. Relationism, then,
might not take us past anthropocentrism, but it does take us past
human chauvinism. I have also suggested that its proponentsmight
highlight the superiority of weak over strong anthropocentrism
(Hargrove, 2003), and Hayward. (1997) has similarly argued that it
is not anthropocentrism itself which is the problem, but the various
forms of speciesism and human chauvinism.
Relationist neo-anthropocentrism allows us to explore the
potential of social ecology as the basis for determining moral
standing, and this is indeed valuable, as also shown through
traditional approaches to relational ethics and care ethics.
However, in contrast to relational non-anthropocentric
approaches, such as deep ecology, this form of social ecology
explicitly centers humans as their treatment of and relations with
others give rise to the other’s moral standing. Relationalism as it is
used in the robot ethics discourse provides an interesting
theoretical path towards providing robots with moral standing.
It is, however, beleaguered by a number of challenges, and this
article is intended as a challenge and a request for further
elaboration of the approach and theories based on this
approach in order to clarify and more clearly position the
theory in relation to other related theories and concepts from
environmental ethics, such as anthropocentrism. This is not to
say that proponents of a relational ethics have not acknowledged
the challenges and complexities associated with
relationalism–they have–but merely to state that there are still
questions that need answering and clarifications that must
be made.
On a closing note, some proponents of relationalism might
come to accept the label of neo-anthropocentrism and their
reliance on a traits-based approach. However, a consequence
of this would be that some of the purported advantages of
relationism–such as removing us from human chauvinism and
the problematic focus on traits–would have to be abandoned.
Gellers (2020, p. 153) has to some extent done just this, as he
argues that his “explicitly relational” approach must to some
extent be combined with the properties-based approach, even if
this reintroduces some of the problems associated with properties
as a basis of moral standing. And, while it may not be
chauvinistic, it is anthropocentric.
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